We introduce a logic for temporal beliefs and intentions based on Shoham's database perspective. We separate strong beliefs from weak beliefs. Strong beliefs are independent from intentions, while weak beliefs are obtained by adding intentions to strong beliefs and everything that follows from that. We formalize coherence conditions on strong beliefs and intentions. We provide AGMstyle postulates for the revision of strong beliefs and intentions. We show in a representation theorem that a revision operator satisfying our postulates can be represented by a pre-order on interpretations of the beliefs, together with a selection function for the intentions.
Introduction
Recently there has been an increase in articles studying the dynamics of intentions in logic [Ditmarsch et al., 2011; Icard et al., 2010; Lorini and Herzig, 2008; van der Hoek et al., 2007; Lorini et al., 2009; Grant et al., 2010] . Most of those papers take as a starting point the logical frameworks derived from Cohen and Levesque [1991] , which in turn formalize Bratman's [1987] planning theory of intention. In this paper, we take a different starting point, and study the revision of intentions from a database perspective [Shoham, 2009] . The database perspective consists of a planner, a belief database and an intention database. Shoham [2016] describes it as "(...) a generalization of the AGM scheme for belief revision, (...). In the AGM framework, the intelligent database is responsible for storing the planner's beliefs and ensuring their consistency. In the enriched framework, there are two databases, one for beliefs and one for intentions, which are responsible for maintaining not only their individual consistency but also their mutual consistency." (p.48) Shoham further developed these ideas with Jacob Banks, one of his PhD students, and behavioral economist Dan Ariely in the intelligent calendar application Timeful, which attracted over $6.8 million in funding and was acquired by Google in 2015 1 , who aim to integrate it into their Calendar applications. As Shoham [2016] says himself: "The point of the story is there is a direct link between the original journal paper and the ultimate success of the company." (p.47) Thus, it seems clear that his philosophical proposal has lead to some success on the practical side. In this paper, we investigate whether his proposal can lead to interesting theoretical insights as well. More specifically, the aim of this paper is to develop a suitable formal theory for the belief and intention database in the database perspective, and to study belief and intention revision for this theory. Following Shoham's proposal, our methodology is to generalize AGM revision [Alchourron et al., 1985] for temporal beliefs and intentions in terms of a representation theorem.
In the area of intention revision and reconsideration, Grant et al. [2010] combine intention revision with AGM-like postulates.
There have also been a number of contributions applying AGM-style revision to action logics [Shapiro et al., 2011; Jin and Thielscher, 2004; Scherl, 2005; Scherl and Levesque, 2003; Bonanno, 2007] . However, these proposals only characterize revision using a set of postulates, without proving representation theorems.
There are also approaches that focus on the semantical level by postulating revision on a Kripke model [Baral and Zhang, 2005] . Both Icard et al. [2010] and van Zee et al. [2015b] develop a logic based on Shoham's database perspective and prove representation theorems, but we will analyze the shortcomings of their proposals in the next section.
The three main technical results of this paper are as follows: First we review two recent formalisations based on Shoham's database perspective, namely the IPS framework [Icard et al., 2010] and the PAL framework [van Zee et al., 2015a] , and we discuss the shortcomings of these logics. Secondly, we extend PAL in order to define a coherence condition on strong beliefs and intentions, and we separate strong, or intention-independent, beliefs from weak beliefs. Lastly, we characterize revision of beliefs and intentions through AGM-style postulates and we prove a representation theorem relating the postulates for revision to an ordering among interpretations and a selection function that accommodates new intentions while restoring coherence. The three next sections of the paper are in line with these three results.
Preliminaries: The Database Perspective
We review Shoham's database perspective, and we discuss the main limitations of two recent formalizations. For the first formalization (IPS), the separation between strong and weak beliefs is problematic, and the representation theorem only holds for a specific type of beliefs. For the second formalization (PAL), intention revision is missing.
Shoham's Database Perspective
Shoham's database perspective contains a planner (e.g., a STRIPS-like planner) that is itself engaged in some form of practical reasoning. In the course of planning, it may add actions to be taken at various times in the future to an intention database and add observations to a belief database. The intentions are future-directed intentions of the form (a,t), meaning that action a will be executed at time t. 2 The beliefs are also time-indexed, and are of the form p t , meaning that p is true at time t. Shoham treats the planner as a "black box": It provides the databases with input but its internal workings are unknown. Shoham proposes informal revision procedures for beliefs and intentions based on the following coherence conditions:
1. If two intended actions immediately follow one another, the earlier cannot have postconditions that are inconsistent with the preconditions of the latter.
2. If you intend to take an action you cannot believe that its preconditions do not hold.
3. If you intend to take an action, you believe that its postconditions hold.
Note that requirement 2 and 3 describe an asymmetry between pre-and postconditions: The postconditions are believed to be true after an intended action, but the preconditions may not. Therefore, we might think of the requirements as one of "optimistic" beliefs. According to Shoham [2009] : "It is a good fit with how planners operate. Adopting an optimistic stance, they feel free to add intended actions so long as they are consistent with current beliefs." (p.7) Icard et al. [2010] develop a "formal semantical model to capture action, belief and intention, based on the 'database perspective"' (p.1). They assume a set of atomic sentences Prop = {p, q, r, . . .} and deterministic primitive actions Act={a, b, c, . . .}. Entries in the belief database are represented by a language generated from:
Icard et al. (IPS)
with p ∈ Prop, a ∈ Act, and t ∈ Z. p t means that p is true at time t, Do(a) t means that the agent does action a at time t, and 2 The notion of intention here is clearly quite restrictive and important characteristics of intentions are missing. See the conclusion for a discussion.
pre(a) t and post(a) t represent respectively the precondition and postcondition of action a at time t.
Icard et al. use a semantics of appropriate paths. They
, and a path π : Z → (P × Act) as a mapping from a time point to a set of proposition-like formulas true at that time (denoted π(t) 1 ) and the next action a on the path (denoted π(t) 2 ). They define an equivalence relation π ∼ t π ′ , which means that π and π ′ represent the same situation up to t. Using this, they propose a notion of appropriateness: Definition 1 (Appropriate Set of Paths). A set of paths Π is appropriate iff for all π ∈ Π:
The truth definition |= Π is defined relative to an appropriate set of paths Π, and the modality is defined as follows:
A model for a formula is an appropriate set of paths. They introduce an intention database I = {(a,t), . . .} as a set of action-time pairs (a,t) and put the following coherence condition on their logic:
This captures the intuition that an agent considers it possible to carry out all intended actions. They state that a set of models is coherent if and only if there exists a model in which Cohere * (I) is true. IPS distinguishes intention-contingent, or weak, beliefs from non-contingent, or strong, beliefs. Contingent beliefs B I are obtained from a belief-intention database (B, I) as follows:
. In order to switch from belief bases to an appropriate set of paths, Icard et al. introduce the functions ρ and β: "Given a set of formulas B, we can consider the set of paths on which all formulas of B hold at time 0, denoted ρ(B). Conversely, given a set of paths Π, we let β(Π) be defined as the set of formulas valid at 0 in all paths in Π." (p.
3) The first issue with IPS is that the definition of noncontingent beliefs is problematic for coherence. The following example shows that non-contingent beliefs that are dependent on the actual path can lead to a coherent agent with inconsistent weak beliefs.
Example 1. Consider an IPS belief-intention base (B, I) with the belief base B
this is inconsistent with the initial belief p 1 .
In Section 3 we will define our notion of coherence that together with a separation between strong and weak beliefs resolves this problem.
The second issue with IPS is that the definition of ρ is circular, and as a result it does not seem to be possible for all formulas of their logic. Consider the following example. Essentially, according to IPS, ρ(B) = {π | π |= Π B}. The set of appropriate paths for a belief base B is thus constructed using |= Π . However, |= Π is aleady defined relatively to some set of paths Π. Therefore, the definition of ρ is circular. It seems that the ρ function only works for belief bases containing no modalities (in other words, to construct a single path). We omit details for space constraints, but the construction of the canonical model in the proof of their representation theorem uses the ρ function to switch from a belief base to a set of paths (see Proof Sketch in the Appendix of Icard et al. [2010] ). Therefore, the representation theorem does not hold for all formulas of the logic, since it is not possible to apply the function ρ to all beliefs.
Summarizing, we recognize two shortcoming of the IPS framework as a formal basis for the database perspective: The definition of contingent beliefs is problematic, and the representation theorem does not hold for belief bases containing modalities. van Zee et al. [2015b] develop Parameterized-time Action Logic (PAL) as an alternative to IPS, claiming that the IPS framework contains an unsound axiom and that their logic is noncompact [van Zee et al., 2015a] . They define Act = {a, b, c, . . .} as a finite set of deterministic primitive actions, and Prop = {p, q, r, . . .} ∪ {pre(a), post(a) | a ∈ Act} as a finite set of propositions. They denote atomic propositions with χ. PAL differs syntactically from IPS in that themodality is indexed by a time-point. Their language L PAL is inductively defined by the following BNF grammar:
van Zee et al. (PAL)
PAL uses a CTL*-like tree semantics consisting of a tree T = (S, R, v, act) where S is a set of states, R is an accessibility relation that is serial, linearly ordered in the past and connected, v : S → 2 Prop is a valuation function from states to sets of propositions, and act : R → Act is a function from accessibility relations to actions, such that actions are deterministic, i.e. if act((s, s ′ )) = act((s, s ′′ )), then s ′ = s ′′ . Similarly to Icard et al., PAL uses an equivalence relation ∼ t on paths. Using this equivalence relations they define a model as a pair (T, π) on which the same conditions hold as an IPS model. PAL formulas are evaluated in a model on a path. van Zee et al. axiomatize PAL and show that it is sound and strongly complete, i.e. T ⊢ ϕ iff T |= ϕ. They characterize AGM belief revision in this logic and restrict time up to some t. Using these constraints, they are able to represent a belief set B as a propositional formula ψ such that B = {ϕ | ψ ⊢ ϕ} and they prove the Katsuno and Mendelzon (KM) [1991] and the Darwiche and Pearl (DP) [Darwiche and Pearl, 1997] representation theorems. van Zee et al. only consider revision of PAL formulas and thus do not consider the problem of intention revision, and therefore also does not distinguish between strong and weak beliefs. However, PAL uses a standard branching time (CTL*-like [Reynolds, 2002] ) semantics, and it therefore also does not suffer from the shortcomings that we addressed in the previous subsection. Therefore, we take PAL as a starting point and use the remainder of this paper to extend it so that we can study intention revision.
The Belief-Intention Database
We assume an intention database I = {(a,t), . . .} consisting of time-indexed actions. We next define a coherence condition on beliefs and intentions in PAL, and we separate strong and weak beliefs.
The Coherence Condition
We first demonstrate that Cohere * (I) of IPS (Section 2.2) is too permissive because it allows models in which intentions are not jointly executable. 
Example 3 (Running Example). An agent is considering to attend the NMR workshop at time 0 and the IJCAI conference at time 1. Although it would like to attend both events, there is insufficient budget available. Consider a possible partial semantic model of this situation depicted in Figure 1, where the thick path represents the actual path. In the actual path, the agent believes it does nothing at time 0 and attends IJCAI at time 1. It also considers it possible to attend the NMR workshop at time 0 and do nothing at time 1 in an alternative path. However, it does not consider it to be possible to attend both events.
Suppose the agent of the running example has two intentions: I = {(nmr, 0), (i jcai, 1)}. Intuitively, the agent's intentions do not cohere with its beliefs, because it believes it cannot execute them both due to insufficient budget. However, according to Cohere * (I) the agent is coherent because the preconditions of all intentions hold on some path (namely the current path). Thus, Cohere * (I) does not fulfill Shoham's coherence condition 1 (Section 2.1). More specifically, the problem is that it is not possible to define the precondition of a set of actions in terms of preconditions of individual actions, because it cannot be ensured that all the intentions are fulfilled on the same path as well. Therefore, in order to formalize a coherence condition in PAL, we extend the language with preconditions of finite action sequences, which ensures that after executing the first action, the precondition for the remaining actions are still true. We modify the language, the definition of a model, the axiomatization, and we show that the new axiomatization is sound and strongly complete. We call the new logic PAL-P (Parameterized-time Action Logic with extended Preconditions). We also extend the definition of a model accordingly. Definition 3 (PAL-P Model). A model is a pair (T, π) with T = (S, R, v, act) such that for all π ∈ T the following holds: [van Zee et al., 2015b] (Def. 7) , and the following two:
Definition 2 (PAL-P Language
The relation ⊢ is defined in the usual way with the restriction that necessitation can be applied to theorems only. Theorem 1 (Completeness Theorem). The logic PAL-P is sound and strongly complete, i.e. T ⊢ ϕ iff T |= ϕ. 3 The proof of the theorem is a direct extension the proof of van Zee et al. with the new axioms and the new conditions on a model. Note that it is not directly possible in PAL-P to express preconditions for actions that do not occur directly after each other. In order to do so, we simply make a disjunction over all possible action combinations in the time points in between the actions. Thus, if for instance Act = {a, b} and I = {(a, 1), (b, 3)}, then Cohere(I) = ♦ 0 x∈Act pre (a, x, b) 
3 We provide the full proofs of all theorems and propositions in this paper in a separate technical report: http://www.dropbox.com/s/798g6ki0aqt3gds/ijcai2016proofs.pdf?dl=1 4 Our construction of preconditions over action sequences may lead to a coherence condition involving a big disjunction. This is a drawback in terms of computational complexity. Alternatively, one may explicitly denote the time of each precondition, e.g. pre(a, b) (t 1 ,t 2 ) . We chose the former since it is conceptually closer to the original syntax, but the latter can be implemented straightforwardly.
For a given set of models M, we say that (M, I) is coherent iff there exists some m ∈ M with m |= Cohere(I).
We now show that the new coherence conditions correctly specifies that the agent of our running example is not coherent. Example 4 (Continued). The models of the agent of our running example are not coherent with the intention database I = {(nmr, 0), (i jcai, 1)}, because the agent does not have the possibility to jointly execute both intentions (i.e. the preconditions for both actions together is false). Thus, none of the models satisfy ♦ 0 pre(nmr, i jcai) 0 , even though they satisfy ♦ 0 pre(nmr) 0 ∧ ♦ 0 pre(i jcai) 1 .
Strong and Weak Beliefs
The idea behind strong beliefs is that they represent the agent's ideas about what is inevitable, no matter how it would act in the world. Weak beliefs, on the other hand, represent the beliefs of an agent that are the consequence of its planned actions [Van der Hoek and Wooldridge, 2003] . Formally, we define strong beliefs at some time t as formulas that start either with ♦ t or t . The set of all strong beliefs B t in time t for L PAL is inductively defined by the following BNF grammar:
where ψ ∈ L PAL and t ∈ N. A strong belief set in t is B t ⊆ B t .
In the remainder of this paper, we assume t = 0 and we simply write B and B to abbreviate B 0 and B 0 . The weak beliefs W B(B, I) are obtained from the strong beliefs by adding beliefs that are contingent on the intentions of the agent. In other words, the agent weakly believes everything that it strongly believed and moreover that all intentions will be realised, and everything that follows from this: 
Belief and Intention Revision
Postulates Following KM, we fix a way of representing a belief set B consisting of strong beliefs by a propositional formula ψ such that B = {ϕ | ψ ⊢ ϕ}. Since intentions and beliefs that have been added by a planner are naturally bounded up to some time point t, we define a bounded revision function and we restrict the syntax and semantics of PAL-P up to a specific time point. As a consequence, it is then possible to obtain the single formula ψ for a set of strong beliefs B (Corollary 1). We first define some notation that we use in the rest of this paper. We now define a bounded revision function * t revising an agent (ψ, I) with a tuple (ϕ, i) consisting of a strong belief ϕ and an intention i, denoted (ψ, I) * t (ϕ, i), where t is the maximal time point occurring in ψ, I, ϕ, and i.
Definition 7 (Agent Revision Function
). An Agent revision function * t : A × (B × I) → A maps an agent, a strong belief formula, and an intention-all bounded up to t-to an agent bounded up to t such that if,
Postulates (P1)-(P6) are simply the KM postulates in our setting, which are equivalent to the AGM postulates [Katsuno and Mendelzon, 1991] . They also state that the revision of strong beliefs does not depend on the intentions. Postulates (P7)-(P10) also appear in IPS. Postulate (P7) states that the outcome of a revision should be coherent. Postulate (P8) states that the new intention i take precedence over all other current intentions; if possible, it should be added, even if all current intentions have to be discarded. Postulate (P9) and (P10) together state that if it is possible to simply add the intention, then this is the only change that is made. Postulate (P11) states that if we revise with the same i but with a different belief, and we end up with the same belief in both cases, then we also end up with the same intentions. Finally, (P12) states that we do not discard intentions unnecessarily. This last postulate is comparable to the parsimony requirement introduced by Grant et al. [2010] .
Representation Theorem
We next characterize all revision schemes satisfying (P1)-(P12) in terms of minimal change with respect to an ordering among interpretations and a selection function accommodating new intentions while restoring coherence. We bound models of strong beliefs up to t, which means that all the paths in the model are "cut off" at t. This ensures finitely many non-equivalent formulas for some belief set B. A t-bounded model m |t = (T |t , π |t ) is a model containing a tree T in which all paths, including π, have length t. Strong beliefs are about possibility and necessity, and they are independent of a specific path. Therefore, if a single path in a tree is a model of a strong belief, then all paths in this tree are models of this strong belief. Formally, a set of models of a strong belief M SB satisfies the following condition:
A set of t-bounded models of a strong belief M |t SB contains only t restricted models of a strong belief. We write M |t SB to denote the set of all sets of t-bounded models of strong beliefs. We now show that we can represent a set of models of strong beliefs by a single formula. 
